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ABSTRACT: The term technological fix, coined by technologist/administrator
Alvin Weinberg in 1965, vaunted engineering innovation as a generic tool
for circumventing problems commonly conceived as social, political, or cul-
tural. A longtime Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, government
consultant, and essayist, Weinberg also popularized the term big science to
describe national goals and the competitive funding environment after the
Second World War. Big science reoriented towards technological fixes, he
argued, could provide a new “Apollo project” to address social problems of
the future. His ideas—most recently echoed in “solutionism”—have chan-
neled confidence and controversy ever since. This article traces the genesis
and promotion of the concept by Weinberg and his contemporaries. It
argues that, through the concept, the marginal politics and technological
confidences of interwar scientists and technocrats were repositioned as
mainstream notions closer to the heart of big science policy.
Introduction
This article traces the packaging and promotion of an idea that has
long been implicit in culture. Reliance upon technological solutions to
address human problems is arguably a human trait, but it became a more
ubiquitous aspect associated with modernity over the past century. Rapid
innovation encouraged widespread appreciation of the potential of tech-
nologies to alter modern societies. This confidence, or hubris, concerning
the power of technological approaches has ranged from the design of in-
herently safe streetcars to proposals for remediating climate change.1
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While scholars and designers have both analyzed the links between
invention and societal outcomes, there has been a discernable trend toward
the framing and addressing of contemporary problems in narrow techno-
logical terms.2 The legacy of such ideas remains current today: recent
expressions of technological “solutionism” (“there’s an app for that”) echo
these enduring cultural assurances.3 A seminal spokesperson for this opti-
mistic belief was Alvin Weinberg, the longtime director of Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL), who coined and popularized the term tech-
nological fix from the mid-1960s onward and captured these widely shared
assumptions. In its simplest form, the label refers merely to the solving of
a problem by means of an engineering approach; its more contentious
dimension, however, was Weinberg’s claim that solutions founded on
technological innovation may be innately superior for addressing issues
traditionally defined as social, political, or cultural. Historians have ex-
plored twentieth-century case studies identified retroactively as technolog-
ical fixes. As historian Thomas Hughes summarized from such cases,
“most technological fixes leave us in a fix.” Yet, this critical judgment is un-
equally subscribed across the academic disciplines and through popular
culture: views range from outright dismissal of this putative societal tool to
optimism about timely technological solutions to human problems.4
I focus on the discourse about such approaches, and explore the con-
text within which the notion of the technological fix was voiced and illus-
trated from the mid-twentieth century onward. Tracking the evolution of
ideas by key actors and interpreters, my primary sources are the writings
of, and responses to, Weinberg and his contemporaries. The shared work-
ing environments of these actors had included interwar progressive sci-
ence, wartime American technology, postwar national laboratories, and
subsequent science policy advising. These evolving contexts gradually
altered how they envisaged the societal benefits of science. The narrative
consequently entrains not just postwar scientists and engineers, but also
contemporary analysts and critics of technoscience.
Weinberg had to work hard to convince his audiences (and himself) that
the notion was sound and valuable as a general approach to problem-solv-
ing. Statistics about the usage of the term hint at the correlation between his
active promotion and subsequent popularity of it. The rhetoric of technol-
ogy as problem-solving tool rose during the late 1960s and proved to be
enduring in written discourse. I argue that the embedding of technological
fixes as a compact concept in modern culture is attributable to Weinberg’s
unique combination of interests, skills, and career context. His activities as
a networker and essayist and penchant for packaging contentious ideas
2. Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization; Jacques Ellul, La Technique, Ou L’en-
jeu du Siècle; Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man.
3. Trademarkia, “There’s an App for That Trademark Information”; Evgeny Moro-
zov, To Save Everything, Click Here.
4. Thomas P. Hughes, “Afterword.”
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made him an important conduit for discussions of the role of science and
technology in society.5 Weinberg’s promotion of the technological fix was
positioned between, and eventually combined with, two other neologisms
that have generated enduring interest. During the early 1960s, he adopted
the term big science to frame his analysis of government-funded, nationally
oriented science. And from the end of the decade, his term trans-science
labeled problems that required social as well as scientific methods.
The present account explores how Weinberg’s promotion and merging
of these ideas made technological fixes alternately compelling and con-
tentious for varied audiences. Reflecting the rhetoric of interwar and post-
war technocrats, he packaged a commonplace notion and promoted it as
the centerpiece of revitalized big science. His actions thereby reconfigured
the overt politics and social aims of interwar scientists into a strategy of sci-
ence policy. Significantly, Weinberg’s exploration of these ideas has contin-
ued to evoke discussion and shaped the canon of science and technology
studies and syllabuses of the history of technology over the half-century
since they were coined.
Alvin Weinberg as Mid-Century Technoscientist
Born in 1915, Weinberg obtained his first two degrees in physics from
the University of Chicago during the 1930s, and subsequently taught for
two years at a junior college in the city. His career interests were broad, as
suggested by doctoral studies in the emerging field of mathematical biol-
ogy under Nicolas Rashevsky. His goal of modeling periodicities in cell
metabolism was ambitious in relating the tools of physics to the living
world.6 Through his supervisor, Weinberg developed interests in mathe-
matical sociology and, via Rashevsky’s acquaintance Alfred Korzybski,
pursued studies of semantics and logic. These pursuits supported his later
activities as public speaker and essayist.
Weinberg gained his substantive working experience as a physicist dur-
ing the early years of World War II, directly involved in designing the first
nuclear reactors for the Manhattan Project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and
Hanford, Washington. His mentor and lifelong friend Eugene Wigner
(1902–95) later recalled Weinberg as “a natural diplomat.” Wigner identi-
fied these wider competences and orientations as Weinberg’s key strengths:
5. Google Books, Ngram Viewer terms technological fix, technical fix, and techno-
logical solution (available at https://books.google.com/ngrams [accessed 20 July 2015]);
Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digi-
tized Books.” Usage in British English rises some five years after that in the United
States; German and French have no direct equivalents, using either the imported Eng-
lish-language technological fix or else the earlier and broader terms technische Lösung
and solution technique, respectively.
6. Alvin M. Weinberg, The First Nuclear Era, 7–9.
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“We set him to work on broader scientific questions. His grasp of human
personality won over many doubters. He never failed us.”7
Weinberg’s links with Rashevsky and Korzybski were later to channel
his first enunciation of the technological fix, but these unconventional con-
tacts attracted the attention of postwar security officers. His interview pro-
vides a glimpse of Weinberg’s “generally liberal” politics, later to be sub-
sumed within his views on technology. He recalled his political philosophy
being “flavored by the spirit that pervaded the college campus,” contribut-
ing to organizations “in which there were certainly Communists . . . but after
joining I somehow felt my conscience had been salved.” Security officials
also scrutinized Weinberg’s wartime associations with groups “dissatisfied
with the conduct of the [Manhattan] project.” He responded that this
“group of younger scientists” was concerned with “the impact of what
atomic scientists were doing in the world at large.” In summary, he noted, “I
have been in the past, if you like, a person on the Progressive side, although,
unfortunately, I seem to be getting more conservative as I grow older.”8
Weinberg as Voice of Postwar Science
While Weinberg’s social concerns mirrored those of many of his con-
temporaries, his postwar activities were directed toward disciplinary and
career ambitions. Oak Ridge became a national laboratory in 1946, but as its
technical director from 1948 on, Weinberg had to lobby actively for the facil-
ity’s continued work on the design and applications of nuclear reactors, in
competition with the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago.9 His co-
organizing of what was known informally as the “Clinch College of Nuclear
Knowledge” (1946) attracted sponsorship from influential students, such as
Commander Hyman Rickover, who was to foster the nuclear navy. The sub-
sequent Institute of Nuclear Studies (ORINS, from 1947) and School of
Reactor Technology (ORSORT, from 1950) predated university teaching of
the subject by a decade10 (fig. 1). While operating within a strict security en-
vironment, both ORNL and ORINS were outward-looking; their staffs, stu-
dents, and visitors represented U.S. companies, government services, and
academic affiliations. ORINS was directed by academics from eight univer-
sities spanning not just physics and chemistry, but also biology and medi-
7. Ibid., 13; Eugene Wigner and Andrew Szanton, The Recollections of Eugene P.
Wigner, 216–17.
8. Oak Ridge Operations Manager, “Dr Alvin A. Weinberg Security Clearance
Meeting,” 29 September 1948, box 14, folder 4, in Weinberg Papers, Modern Political
Archives (hereafter MPA), at the Howard H. Baker Jr. Center for Public Policy, Univer-
sity of Tennessee.
9. See, for example, Alvin Weinberg to J. Robert Oppenheimer, letter, 6 January
1948, box 17, folder 5, in MPA. 
10. Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy.
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cine. Its lab facilities, traveling speakers, and graduate-training program dis-
seminated atomic expertise to the first generation of postwar technologists.11
Assuming overall direction of ORNL in 1955, Weinberg’s management
style further expanded his professional networks. He implemented an an-
nual review system for the burgeoning departments, ranging from chemi-
cal technology to radiation biology, based on external assessors and all-lab
“information meetings.” His expanding contacts led to reciprocal arrange-
ments, including roles in external reviewing of academic departments and
membership on advisory committees of organizations, such as the Nation-
al Academy of Sciences (NAS). By mid-career, Weinberg’s committee
work and handpicked review panels provided a rich network of contacts.
As his status grew, he sponsored those he admired for membership in the
Washington, D.C. Cosmos Club, which promoted science, literature, and
art for the American intellectual elite. Weinberg consequently was able to
survey not just the nascent field of nuclear science and engineering, but
also the changing terrain of government-funded science via the perspec-
tives of other disciplines. And his growing predilection for public speaking
provided a platform for his evolving views about the integration of tech-
nological innovation with the goals of modern U.S. society.12
11. Sean F. Johnston, The Neutron’s Children.
12. Alex Zucker interview.
FIG. 1 Alvin Weinberg teaching at the Oak Ridge School of Reactor Technology,
1954. (Source: ORNL Photo Archives 13125.)
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Touchstones for Weinberg’s Ideas
Both in his personal papers and autobiographical publications, Wein-
berg acknowledged his reliance upon peers to assess and refine his notions,
a strategy that also underlay his information-meeting approach to ORNL’s
management. His ideas typically were shaped by a sequence of personal in-
sights, one-to-one soundings with colleagues, and trial speeches to diverse
audiences. The role of mentors and confidantes was crucial to these itera-
tions. While these informal advisors shifted and expanded throughout his
career, only a handful contributed to what was to become the technolog-
ical fix.
The earliest and most enduring of these advisors was Wigner, a physi-
cist. He had been Weinberg’s immediate superior during the Manhattan
Project, responsible for designing the first pilot-plant nuclear reactor at
Oak Ridge, and the mammoth plutonium-production reactors at Hanford.
After the war, Wigner served as the research director of ORNL, a post he
passed on to Weinberg two years later. A political conservative, Wigner
railed against lab bureaucracy and positioned himself outside the main-
stream of U.S. government policy by lobbying for civil defense measures
alongside nuclear weapons.13
Weinberg’s public adoption of his mentor’s views was illustrated by his
serving on the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) on civil
defense during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, and imple-
menting a civil defense research project at ORNL in 1964, with Wigner at
the helm. This project is notable in being the only example in Weinberg’s
career in which social measures were to be vaunted over technological ap-
proaches. Aiming to look at civil defense “from the broadest possible view-
point,” it would consist initially of “about a dozen mature natural and
behavioral scientists . . . to develop a coherent picture of the whole Civil
Defense problem.” The project led to the employment of sociologists at
ORNL and the opportunity to directly inter-compare the social science
and engineering approaches for solving societal problems.14
Harvey Brooks was Weinberg’s second most influential guide during the
1960s. The dean of Engineering and Applied Physics at Harvard, Brooks had
received his education and experience during World War II. Like Weinberg,
he had participated in designing postwar nuclear reactors and developed an
interest in applying scientific expertise for policymakers. Weinberg and
Brooks first interacted via an ad hoc committee on reactor policies and pro-
13. See, for example, Wigner and Szanton, The Recollections of Eugene P. Wigner,
287–96; Alvin M. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science, 139–40.
14. Alvin Weinberg to H. L. Brode, letter, 1 April 1965, “Civilian Defense” file, cab-
inet 2, drawer 4, in Weinberg Archives, Children’s Museum of Oak Ridge (hereafter
CMOR). Weinberg’s sister was also a sociologist, at the University of the Pacific in
Stockton, California.
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grams for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1958, and later through
NAS’s Committee on Science and Public Policy (COSPUP), which Brooks
chaired.15 As his obituary put it, Brooks was interested “in the sociopolitical
context of science,” seeking “to understand both the human and the more
intellectual dimensions of a rational society,” with science being “driven by
societal needs.” Weinberg was to credit Brooks with clarifying his ideas
about technological fixes as a positive rational route for society.16
Two other scholars had a role in nurturing Weinberg’s ideas about sci-
ence and society. The first was Yale historian and bibliometrist of science
Derek de Solla Price. Weinberg first encountered de Solla Price’s writings in
1961 in the midst of developing his critique of big science and recom-
mended him as a forecaster to a presidential advisor.17 In committee work
and his first public exposure via speeches and newspaper articles, Wein-
berg had been reflecting on the implications of government-funded science,
and particularly on the challenges of adequately funding the explosively ex-
panding variety of worthy projects. He had already courted controversy by
calling for the prioritization of big science having demonstrable social im-
pact, notably questioning the value of the space program instead of medical
research to discover more effective treatments for cancer.18
De Solla Price’s historical extrapolation of scientific activities appeared
to support Weinberg’s conviction that the trajectory of science had to
change—and quickly. He struck up a correspondence with the historian,
with topics ranging from the resource constraints limiting scientific expan-
sion to the deterioration of scientific writing style, musings that were to
inform Weinberg’s subsequent speeches, essays, and committee work over
the following five years. Weinberg discovered that his own views, founded
on a career in engineering and administration, accorded closely with those
of the humanities scholar. The two organized a six-week summer institute
at ORNL on “Humanistic Discussions in Science” in 1963, teaching along-
side Robert Oppenheimer, anthropologist Margaret Mead, and historian
of technology Melvin Kranzberg. Weinberg’s writings on big science were
15. See “Harry D. Smyth” file, cabinet 14, drawer 4, in CMOR.
16. Lewis M. Branscomb, “Harvey Brooks”; see, for example, Harvey Brooks, “The
Evolution of U.S. Science Policy.”
17. Alvin Weinberg to Jerome Weisner, memorandum, 26 June 1961, “De Solla
Price correspondence,” cabinet 3, drawer 4, in CMOR. Wiesner (1915–94) was an MIT
professor of engineering and the chair of President Kennedy’s Science Advisory Com-
mittee.
18. “Cure Cancer?”; Alvin M. Weinberg, “‘Big Science’: A Liability?,” “Big Science—
Marvel or Menace?,” and “Big Science, Big Technology, and Social Organization,”
American Chemical Society Southeastern Regional Meeting, Gatlinburg West Virginia,
1 November 1962, Box 85, folder 15, in MPA.0332; Gene Bylinsky, “Is ‘Big Science’
Headed for ‘Big Trouble’?” Weinberg’s speech (“Impact of Large-Scale Science on the
USA”) was described as “frank and courageous” by his local newspaper, and in a se-
quence followed by most of his subsequent public addresses, it was published as an essay
(Weinberg, “Impact of Large-Scale Science in the U.S.”).
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mirrored by de Solla Price’s book quantifying its historical dimensions (fig.
2). Allied with this scholarly backup, this first public foray into science pol-
icy yielded favorable reviews from the press and encouraged further pro-
vocative reflections on science and society. Indeed, he was to confide that
“writing controversial essays” about big science was “a risky business,” and
that he was “reconciled to reading violent reviews from my colleagues who
differ fundamentally with my viewpoint.”19
19. Derek de Solla Price, “The Acceleration of Science,” “The Beginning and the
End of the Scientific Revolution,” and Little Science, Big Science; Weinberg, “Impact of
Large-Scale Science in the U.S.” and Reflections on Big Science; Alvin Weinberg to Derek
de Solla Price, letter, 29 May 1963, “De Solla Price” file, cabinet 3, drawer 3; Alvin Wein-
berg to Lord Snow of Leicester, letter, 24 August 1965, “Chron 1965-2” file, cabinet 5,
drawer 4. Both letters in CMOR.
FIG. 2 1962 poster for a public lecture by Alvin Weinberg on the challenges of
“Big Science,” a term he popularized. (Source: MPA Box 14, folder 27. Univer-
sity of Tennessee, Knoxville—Libraries.)
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20. Emmanuel G. Mesthene, “On Understanding Change” and “How Technology
Will Shape the Future.”
21. John von Neumann, “Can We Survive Technology?”; Rachel Carson, Silent
Spring; Hans Bethe, “The Social Responsibilities of Scientists and Engineers”; Alvin M.
Weinberg, “Technological Gigantism and the Social Responsibility of the Nuclear
Scientist: Presentation before Brookings Institution, Advanced Study Program, 12
February 1964,” Box 114, folder 19, in MPA.0332; Alvin Weinberg to Hans Bethe, let-
ter, 9 March 1964, “Chron 1964–69” files, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR.
22. Weinberg recommended the catchphrase “Water for Peace” to describe nuclear
desalination research, modeled on the earlier phrase “Atoms for Peace” coined by the
Eisenhower administration—“a phrase that has been widely used and which has
Weinberg’s other significant adviser was Emmanuel Mesthene, the
director of Harvard’s Program on Technology and Society, which had been
set up with IBM funding in 1964. Mesthene himself was an academic phi-
losopher and former RAND Corporation researcher, and like Weinberg
was confident of the role of technology in shaping the future both in terms
of improved social structures and more effective political initiatives.
Brooks was a contributor to his Harvard program, and both Mesthene and
Weinberg were members of Brooks’s COSPUP. Mesthene was a sounding
board for Weinberg’s private musings on technological fixes from 1965,
and was later to publish the first book anthology that included Weinberg’s
initial writing on the subject.20
Gestating the Technological Fix
The nascent idea of the technological fix gestated in an environment
that provided attention and considerable admiration for Weinberg’s views.
His public addresses during the early 1960s focused on two favorite topics.
First was his teasing out of the implications of big science. As he reiterated,
the new scale of research would demand prioritized government funding,
but “technological gigantism” would also require scientists to be more soci-
ally aware and responsible about the consequences of applications, and to
consider the potential for accidents. Weinberg drew on contemporary cri-
tiques to nuance his own messages. These updated the warnings of John
von Neumann about large-scale technologies, cited the work of biologist
Rachel Carson on the ecological catastrophe of DDT, and chimed with
ideas expressed by Hans Bethe scarcely a month earlier.21 Weinberg’s sec-
ond hobbyhorse was scientific literacy, which ranged from criticisms of jar-
gonistic technical writing to calls for better science education in schools. He
was also becoming more conscious of the power of language and presenta-
tion. He counseled an acquaintance in the Office of Science and Technology
on coining catch phrases, suggesting that a catchy slogan could suggest the
linkage of ideas, even if it did not reflect reality. Through these avocational
ventures he attracted positive mentions from scholars in the humanities
and social sciences, as well as praise from newspaper editorialists.22
06_Johnston 620–51.qxp_03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  8/16/18  12:35 PM  Page 628
JOHNSTONK|KAlvin Weinberg and the Technological Fix
629
brought prestige to our country even if it hasn’t brought peace to the world” (Alvin
Weinberg to D. Z. Beckler, letter, 22 September 1965, “Chron 1965-2” file, cabinet 5,
drawer 4, in CMOR. The press praise includes “The University and Society,” New York
Times, 10 August 1965.
23. Alvin Weinberg to E. Garfield, letter, 26 January 1967, “Chron 1967-1” file, cab-
inet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR.
24. Alvin Weinberg to E. W. Morehouse, letter, 15 March 1966, and Weinberg to
Garrett Hardin, letter, 25 March 1966, both in “Chron 1966-1” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4,
in CMOR; Garrett Hardin, “Lifeboat Ethics.”
25. M. W. Newman, “Calls Dread of the Atom Bar to War.”
26. For a contemporary account from the Los Angeles Times, see Jerry Cohen and
William S. Murphy, Burn Baby Burn!
From the early 1960s, his views on big science provided Weinberg with
a platform for greater influence. His authority as director of a national lab
allowed a degree of outspokenness and favored his expanded public speak-
ing and press coverage; work in advisory committees encouraged his mus-
ings on the role of science in society; and, interaction with a spectrum of
scientists and scholars drew him toward what he later summarized as
interest in the “the philosophy of science and the government of science.”23
Further networking accentuated Weinberg’s confidence. He spent Febru-
ary 1966 on sabbatical at the University of California at Santa Barbara to
prepare a collection of his essays that were later published as Reflections on
Big Science. While there, he wrote that “I became more and more involved
with various segments of the faculty—in particular, the Philosophy, Engi-
neering, Biology, and Physics Departments . . . a sort of roving critic who
was willing to express ideas . . . the University got its money’s worth out of
my stay.” And there he encountered other forthright scholars, notably phi-
losopher Garrett Hardin, later the author of provocative environmental
essays.24
Specific events further stimulated Weinberg to focus his ideas about
technological solutions for societal problems. He attended the Second
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs in 1958, where he re-
newed contact with freethinkers like Leo Szilard, but also made new
acquaintances with Soviet counterparts, such as Alexander Topchiev—
both of whom were founder-organizers. The experience may have inspired
Weinberg’s first publicly expressed views linking technology to social con-
sequences: a 1960 newspaper interview about the products of the national
labs. Military technologies, he suggested, could ensure political stability.
This commonplace idea—widely shared if seldom stated compactly—was
successively sharpened as Weinberg identified more examples.25
The earliest and arguably most contentious such case concerned the
Watts riots in August 1965. Harsh police treatment of an African-Ameri-
can motorist had led to community outrage in the Los Angeles neighbor-
hood and a week of public unrest, arson, and looting, quelled at great cost
in lives and property by the California National Guard.26 Two days after the
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27. Alvin Weinberg to Donald F. Hornig, letter, 19 August 1965, “Chron 1965-2”
file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
28. Alvin Weinberg to John A. McCone, letter, 23 August 1965, in ibid. 
29. The “someone” providing the Ellsworth Huntington reference, Civilization and
Climate, was likely Harvey Brooks. Weinberg recommended him to Mesthene as being
“a superb person to advise you about the validity of the idea,” and subsequently high-
lighted Brooks’s role in shaping it during their conversations between Boston meetings.
riots ended, Weinberg wrote to an influential contact, Donald Hornig, who
was a special assistant to President Johnson for science and technology. In
thinking about the riots, Weinberg said that “I began to wonder whether
there was any cheap engineering fix which was likely to reduce the proba-
bility of their occurrence at least for a sufficient time so that more profound
social changes could have a chance to improve the situation permanently.”
He suggested that “the clue to the engineering fix comes from the observa-
tion that the riots seem to come at the hottest, most uncomfortable time of
the year,” and recommended using anti-poverty funds or money from a
projected low-cost housing bill “to air-condition slum dwellings”:
Air conditioning plus television is almost a sure-fire bet for this 
purpose. I realize that such an approach to the solution of a social
problem of immense proportion sounds awfully pat or even cynical 
or frivolous. Yet, I think it deserves serious thought, since in some
sense it goes directly to one of the roots of the trouble—personal 
discomfort.27
Four days later he wrote to John McCone, the former head of AEC, direc-
tor of the CIA during the Kennedy administration, and currently chair of
the riot investigation committee in California. Weinberg again pitched “a
sort of ‘engineering’ approach to a partial solution to the problem—that is,
simply, provide air conditioners in slum dwelling areas,” and estimated the
cost as $40 million for some 150,000 dwellings.28
Whether the letters’ recipients judged “personal discomfort” as impor-
tant a root as rioters’ anger about endemic racism, poverty, lack of oppor-
tunity, and self-control was moot; no written responses are extant. Wein-
berg nevertheless more cautiously pursued the idea with Mesthene that
autumn. “I am increasingly impressed with what I call the ‘Cheap Techno-
logical Fix’ as a means of circumventing social problems,” he began, and “a
somewhat fanciful [fix] had occurred to me reading about the Los Angeles
race riots”: 
Someone showed me Huntington’s correlation between the incidence
of hot weather and race riots in India, and this immediately suggested
that providing air conditioners . . . might considerably reduce the
probability of race rioting. Admittedly this is a superficial and possi-
bly heartless approach to the problem; yet it has the advantage that 
it just might work.29
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See Alvin Weinberg to J. Lederberg, letter, 24 March 1969, “Chron 1969” file, cabinet 5,
drawer 4, in CMOR; and Weinberg, The First Nuclear Era, 150.
30. Alvin Weinberg to Emmanuel G. Mesthene, letter, 19 August 1965, “Chron
1965-2” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
31. Alvin Weinberg to Emmanuel G. Mesthene, letter, 16 November 1965, in ibid.;
Weinberg to Mesthene, letter, 1 February 1966, “Chron 1966-1” file, cabinet 5, drawer
4, in CMOR.
In the letter, Weinberg introduced two further examples of “cheap techno-
logical fixes” to Mesthene. The first concerned intrauterine devices (IUDs)
for birth control. He suggested that “before the ring was invented, birth
control was a desperately complicated social problem—its solution re-
quired convincing many, many individuals to change their habits and their
outlook,” but that the IUD “greatly simplifies the matter [by] drastically
reducing the daily motivation” needed for birth control.
Similarly, he identified nuclear weapons themselves as a cheap techno-
logical fix. “Before the H-bomb,” Weinberg noted, “the problem of war was
largely viewed as being insoluble unless we changed ‘human nature,’ [but]
by exploiting the crassest notion of self-preservation, the H-bomb offers a
quite different ‘solution’ to the problem of war than the whole Judeo-
Christian tradition teaches is possible.” He mused enthusiastically that
such fixes could motivate an evolution from social problem-solving toward
technological methods, and recommended it as a line of inquiry for Mes-
thene’s new Program on Technology and Society: “So to speak, to push the
theme to its illogical end, one can ask ‘will technology make social science
obsolete?’—i.e. can a cheap technological fix be developed for every social
problem that short-cuts and makes irrelevant the issues of human conflict
that underlie the problem as traditionally viewed?”30
Weinberg’s hopes thus went far beyond the stop-gap of literally cooling
down ghetto tensions to provide time for thoughtful social solutions; they
suggested long-term technological interventions that bypassed sociological
approaches, public education, political negotiation, and indeed religious
and moral teachings. And Weinberg’s example of the IUD for birth control
(his wife was active in the Planned Parenthood movement) hinted at a fur-
ther quality of cheap technological fixes: they might work best when shift-
ing power toward technologist problem-solvers and away from more cul-
turally bound recipients. Unlike the daily personal regimen of the recently
introduced birth-control pill, IUDs required infrequent attention though
always in association with a medical authority. Such examples evade label-
ing as either naïve or glib; instead, I would suggest that they illustrate strong
faith in rational problem-solving and attention to aspects amenable to rapid
improvement. He was pleased to find that the idea “rang a bell” with Mes-
thene and, while claiming not to have “the time or knowledge to push the
matter,” soon invited him to Oak Ridge and the Cosmos Club.31
The second timely trigger for Weinberg’s private reflection about fixes
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33. Alvin Weinberg to Ralph Nader, letter, 7 June 1966, “Chron 1966-2” file, cabi-
net 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
34. Alvin Weinberg to C. S. Read, letter, 2 February 1966, “Chron 1966-1” file, cab-
inet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR; Weinberg, “Will Technology Replace Social Engineering?”
Fifteenth Annual Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture, Harvard Club of New York, 29
April 1966, Box 118, folder 3, in MPA.0332; “Can Technology Replace Social Engineer-
ing?” University of Chicago Alumni Award speech, 11 June 1966 (emphasis added) Box
88, folder 7, in MPA.0332.
35. Oak Ridge National Laboratory News; Scientific Research; University of Chicago
Magazine; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Air Force and Space Digest; American Behav-
ioral Scientist; and Chicago Jewish Forum. The unusually wide dissemination of the
essay owed much to Weinberg’s active efforts to publish the text as quickly as possible
and to receptive editors. See, for example, Alvin Weinberg to G. Gordon, 6 July 1966,
and Weinberg to E. Rabinovitch, 5 August 1966—letters, both in “Chron 1966-2” file,
cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
was Ralph Nader’s campaign for automobile safety.32 As he intimated in a
“fan letter,” Weinberg had been struck by Nader’s avowal on Meet the Press
of being “interested in remedies, not causes.” Weinberg identified his own
interest in “the broader question (of which auto safety is one instance)”
and enclosed the text of “a couple of talks on the subject”:
I mention your approach to auto safety as an instance of technology
circumventing the social and psychological aspects of problems that
are normally thought of as primarily social rather than technological.
I originally gave the talk with a bit of tongue-in-cheek, but as I see 
the logic of your approach to auto safety, I begin to think that tech-
nology can replace social engineering to a much greater extent than 
I had suspected.33
Weinberg had discussed the campaign with Nader’s sister Claire, an
ORNL sociologist whom he met regularly as part of the lab’s civil defense
project. His “talks” were two high-visibility speeches, which suggest Wein-
berg’s evolving confidence in the technological fix. The first had been con-
ceived in February 1966 for a lecture in memory of Korzybski. Presented
that April with an introduction by Wigner, the speech was titled “Will
Technology Replace Social Engineering?” The second, six weeks later, was
his last-minute choice for an alumni-award speech at the University of
Chicago and more diffidently titled “Can Technology Replace Social
Engineering?”34
While Weinberg circulated his University of Chicago speech among
his acquaintances, he also actively sought its publication. In essay form,
this technological fix speech was reprinted in no fewer than seven period-
icals, ranging from journals of behavioral science to space engineering,
over the following year, most prominently in the Bulletin of the Atomic Sci-
entists.35 More targeted variants of the essay informed subsequent speeches
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“Can Technology Stabilize the World Order?” and “Is Technology the Answer to All
Our Problems?” Alvin Weinberg to J. E. Spicer, 22 November 1966; Weinberg to J. May-
da, 9 December 1966; and Weinberg to J. D. Winebrenner, 23 December 1966—letters,
all in “Chron 1966-2” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
37. Alvin Weinberg to Harvey Brooks, letter, 17 June 1966, “Chron 1966-2” file,
cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR.  
38. Stephen H. Stow, “An Interview with Alvin Weinberg.” 
39. Richard L. Meier, Science and Economic Development, 226.
40. Richard L. Meier, Modern Science and the Human Fertility Problem and
Planning for an Urban World.
41. Meier, Science and Economic Development, 139.
and articles. Weinberg focused specifically on the political dimensions in
late 1966 by exploring how technology could stabilize international rela-
tions. He also sought more popular venues for his message, ranging from
his local newspaper to the Los Angeles Times. Weinberg’s audiences grew
correspondingly: that autumn, he fielded feedback from a local minister, a
law professor, and a medical administrator for the United Mine Workers.36
He evidently felt that the concept was a matter of common sense, yet elu-
sive to pin down. To Brooks he confided his aim to find a general method
of identifying technological fixes: “It would be a neat trick if the social
problems could be converted into technological problems as, for example,
Ralph Nader is converting the problem of auto safety.”37
Precursors
Others had sought the magician’s trick of transforming the social into
the technical realm. Brooks was probably responsible for pointing Wein-
berg to the publications of Richard Meier. Meier (1920–2007), later de-
scribed by Weinberg as a “professor of everything,” was in fact a wartime
research chemist who turned to investigating technological solutions to
postwar urban problems38 (fig. 3). Developing his ideas during a Fulbright
Fellowship in the postwar UK, he conceived technological means of tack-
ling problems consequent to poverty, social organization, and city infra-
structure. In his first book in 1956, Meier explored technology as a means
of providing “realistic utopias . . . consonant with the resources at the dis-
posal of society.”39 Like Weinberg, he was a technological optimist, but ori-
ented explicitly toward planning technological systems to reduce inequity
and yield wider societal benefits.40 Weinberg soon discovered the pertinent
echo of his own views in Meier’s writing. Discussing social problems,
Meier observed that “[m]ost people would instinctively exclude the scien-
tist and the technologist in the search for solutions. Yet, in many instances,
a social problem can be restated so that it is also a scientific or an engi-
neering problem that is not only researchable, but soluble!”41 Writing that
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42. Alvin Weinberg to Richard L. Meier, letter, 19 December 1966, “Chron 1966-2”
file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR. 
43. Ralph Nader to Alvin Weinberg, letter, 22 October 1966, “Nadar” file, cabinet 7,
drawer 1, in CMOR. 
44. See, for example, Charles H. Wood, “The Birth of the Technical Alliance”;
“this is very much in agreement with my current views,” Weinberg invited
him to lecture at Oak Ridge, an offer that Meier apparently never took up.42
Nader responded positively to Weinberg’s essay: “the points and ad-
dress which you enclosed were rapidly absorbed.” He invited Weinberg to
a conference on “Unreported Problems” and “a panel on non-technical ob-
stacles to innovation,” in which “the key strategy of the technological fix”
would be discussed. Like Brooks, Nader traced Weinberg’s notions to an-
tecedents: “The illustrations of the remedial ‘fix’ have been with us for
years everywhere, from the automatic coupler on the railroads to a stair-
way railing, to a machine guard. Now, when it comes to the 60 year old,
man-machine relationship of driver and car, the idea has to be presented
as if it is de novo.”43 Nader’s examples were in fact remarkably similar to
those cited in speeches and literature by American technocrats from the
1920s through the ’60s. The speeches and writings of its founder, autodi-
dact engineer Howard Scott (1890–1970), and the Technocracy Study
Course, written by geologist cofounder Marion King Hubbert (1903–89),
had discussed examples of guard rails and doors on trams and trains,
machine guards on factory equipment, and even rational road design and
lighting to direct human behaviors without the need for fines, rules, or
training. After their first brief fame during the early 1930s, the technocrats’
rhetoric again came to public attention via well-publicized postwar rallies,
road tours, and membership drives through the 1950s.44 There is no evi-
FIG. 3 Richard L. Meier circa 1970, the first academic promoter and analyst of
technological fixes before the term was coined by Alvin Weinberg. (Source:
Courtesy of photographer Thomas Whitmore. Reprinted with permission.)
06_Johnston 620–51.qxp_03_49.3dobraszczyk 568–  8/16/18  12:35 PM  Page 634
JOHNSTONK|KAlvin Weinberg and the Technological Fix
635
Howard Scott, “Public Lecture by Howard Scott” and “‘Design, Direction or Disaster’”;
and Marion King Hubbert, “Lesson 22.”
45. King Hubbert to W. T. Thagard and Alvin Weinberg, letter, 19 September 1961,
“Hubbert” file, cabinet 6, drawer 1; Hubbert to Weinberg, letter, 31 March 1967, “Chron
1967-1” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, both in CMOR.
46. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Basic Research and National Goals” and “A Department
of Science.”
47. Weinberg, Reflections on Big Science.
48. Alvin Weinberg to Harvey Brooks, letter, 3 March 1967, “Chron 1967-1” file,
cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR; Alvin M. Weinberg, “Social Problems and National
Socio-Technical Institutes,” 415.
dence that Weinberg had encountered technocracy literature before he
formulated his notions of the technological fix, but he had met and corre-
sponded with Hubbert about energy matters in 1961, who later noted the
similarity of their views.45
Merging Technological Fixes with Big Science 
As with his promotion of previous issues, Weinberg interwove his pub-
lic addresses and articles with writing for advisory committees. His first
notions of big science coincided with membership on an NAS committee
examining “Basic Research and National Goals.” The NAS advised on the
level of government support needed to maintain an international lead, and
the current balance of support to various fields—topics in which Wein-
berg’s big science musings fit right in.46 Through 1966 he dedicated his
spare hours to preparing an essay collection, Reflections on Big Science, in
which the relationship between social and technical problem-solving
mooted the concept of technological fixes. As one reviewer noted, “these
reflections represent years of essaying answers to fundamental questions
about the changes in science—changes not only in content alone but in
scale and scope, in method and purpose.”47
A subsequent NAS study chaired by Brooks on technological progress
incorporated Weinberg’s further thoughts on technological fixes, allied
with a shifted focus toward “interdisciplinary, mission-oriented laborato-
ries and the new concern with social problems.” This “extension and elab-
oration of views” from his University of Chicago speech developed the
notion significantly: he now conceived a reconfiguration of labs like ORNL
into “socio-technical institutes” devoted to solving national problems via a
combination of technological fixes and social research.48
Its opening salvo was bold: “a technological invention is easier to make
and put into use than is a social invention.” If technological components in
social problems could be defined, “if, for example, they find their expres-
sion in the invention of a single device—then . . . the underlying social
problems become more tractable.” Weinberg rehearsed the now familiar
examples of car and traffic safety and the H-bomb as peacekeeper, but also
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51. Ibid.; Alvin Weinberg to W. H. Davenport, letter, 14 June 1967, “Chron 1967-
1” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR; Edward Kimbrell, “Weinberg-Baker Propose
Socio-Techno Institutes.”
52. Alvin M. Weinberg and James C. Bresee, “On the Air-Conditioning of Low-
Cost Housing,” “Chron 1968-1” file, cabinet 5 drawer 4; “NCHA Plans Public Housing
Air-Conditioning.” Alvin Weinberg to J. S. Foster Jr., letter, 7 March 1967; Weinberg
identified fossil fuels and nuclear desalination as technologies having dra-
matically negative and positive social implications, respectively.49 As to
“problems that are much more obviously social and that seem to have very
few technological components such as crime, or race relations, or urban
development,” he argued that technical solutions were within grasp. Citing
Meier, Weinberg observed that many problems traditionally viewed as pri-
marily social possess strong technological components. For example, elec-
tronic burglar alarms “would considerably increase the risk a prowler
would have to accept in accosting his intended victim,” even if they did
“nothing to eliminate the causes of crime: poor environment, poverty, bro-
ken homes, and the like.” 
Such “technological palliatives, or even ‘fixes’” could be sought more
systematically, he argued. “There is a severe mismatch between the Gov-
ernment’s magnificent scientific resources for attacking technological
problems and the seeming social character of the problems that the Gov-
ernment is trying to solve.” Weinberg consequently proposed that “the
country’s technologically oriented . . . laboratories and hardware contrac-
tors [be] modified and mobilized to find partial solutions to deeply impor-
tant social problems.”50 His contribution to the NAS report was repro-
duced in ORNL Review and distributed to his peers, including a social
sciences academic at Harvey Mudd College with the “hope that your fresh-
men will tear it to pieces as only 19 year olds can.” The recommendations
were championed by Tennessean Senator Howard Baker Jr., who sought a
Senate select committee on technology and the human environment and
“a dialogue between social scientists, technologists, and other experts
about national problems.”51
Weinberg’s new focus confronted national policy directly and proffered
technological fixes as a political tool. He lobbied the Johnson administration
for air-conditioned low-income housing, garnering coverage in the Wash-
ington Post. And writing more ambitiously to the Department of Defense in
early 1967, he suggested constructing a wall between North and South
Vietnam in order to reduce incursions from the north. Weinberg noted that
ORNL “had done a little thinking about it [and] would be ready to mobilize
around the problem.” Soundings among his peers evidently tempered his
confidence, however; the following month, he backed away from an article
on the idea, describing the notion as “very amateurish” and deleted the
example from the draft of a forthcoming college commencement address.52
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to W. P. Steven, letter, 29 April 1967; and Weinberg, “Agenda for the Seventies,” “Chron
1967-1” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4—all in CMOR.
53. Alvin Weinberg, “The Agro-Industrial Complex” (first draft), 13 August 1967,
“Chron 1967-2” file, cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR.  
54. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Technological Fixes, Carbon Dioxide and Water (Manu-
script, 24 Mar 1994),” box 114, folder 24, in MPA.0332; Dwight D. Eisenhower and
Lewis J. Strauss, “A Proposal for Our Time.”
In its place, Weinberg offered an example that more potently illus-
trated the role of renewed national labs in solving socioeconomic prob-
lems: the development of nuclear agro-industrial complexes. The concept
owed much to Meier’s work a decade earlier, which illustrated how com-
plex technological systems could improve underdeveloped regions. It also
evoked the experience of the state of Tennessee, home to Weinberg and his
ORNL: the Depression-era Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project am-
bitiously had combined hydroelectric dams, waterway diversions, and dis-
tribution networks to provide irrigation, flood control, and electricity—
indeed, the electricity that later powered the uranium-separation plants at
Oak Ridge itself.
Weinberg envisaged vast nuclear-power stations as the hubs of such
networks. They would generate copious electrical power to desalinate sea-
water, energize irrigation systems, manufacture fertilizer and heavy chem-
icals, and provide the motive force for an industrial society. The idea
shifted the technological fix from the notion of a short-term repair to a tool
of international development, as Weinberg argued at a Swedish confer-
ence.53 It also updated and generalized an ORNL research project spawned
by the Eisenhower administration’s “Atoms for Peace” initiative of the late
1950s to investigate nuclear desalination plants for supplying water to arid
regions in the United States. (Small nuclear desalting facilities had been
operated by the Soviet Union since 1964, and later were also built by Japan
and India.) Weinberg’s vision consequently pulled together his experience
as lab director, essayist, and government advisor. As he later recalled, “I
regarded nuclear energy as a magical panacea . . . [with] seemingly unlim-
ited possibilities . . . for solving social problems, poverty, ethnic rivalries
exacerbated by quarrels over water, even war itself.”54
The initiative, developed principally by Lewis Strauss and Weinberg in
collaboration with Israeli and Egyptian engineers, was not pursued by the
Johnson administration. Weinberg subsequently declined an offer by
Strauss to join a Richard Nixon campaign group, because he “assiduously
tried to separate [his] personal political beliefs from public statements.” In-
stead, he sent a briefing paper to each of the major presidential candidates
describing agro-industrial complexes as the “Apollo of the ’70s.” He argued
that federal funding was crucial for such technology projects that were “too
expensive, too long-range and too important for the long-term future of
the country to be supported by the free market.” From technologist-
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56. Emmanuel G. Mesthene, ed., Technology and Social Change; Glenn Seaborg,
“Toward a Science of ‘Techumology.’” Weinberg published some twenty-three articles,
reviews, and editorials in Minerva from 1962 to ’96; in 1983, he and Eugene Wigner
were instrumental in arranging for funding that allowed the journal to continue publi-
cation. On Weinberg’s retrospective views, see his “Edward Shils and the ‘Governmen-
talization’ of Science.”
57. Alvin Weinberg to W. E. Smith, letter, 31 January 1967, “Chron 1967-1” file,
cabinet 5, drawer 4, in CMOR (emphasis in original).
58. Bernard Barber, “Review of Reflections on Big Science by A. M. Weinberg.”
administrator and consultant, Weinberg had moved to a position of direct
political lobbying.55
Contemporary Critiques and Deft Defenses
Weinberg’s networking, speeches, and widely reproduced essays gar-
nered varied attention for technological fixes. Significantly, his closest con-
fidantes—Wigner, Brooks, and de Solla Price—never adopted the term,
and Mesthene limited his public acknowledgment to a 1967 anthology that
included Weinberg’s University of Chicago essay. By contrast, Weinberg’s
direct superior, AEC director Glenn Seaborg, provided an early endorse-
ment, and the University of Chicago sociologist and editor of Minerva
Edward Shils built an enduring relationship, drawing on Weinberg as con-
sultant, referee, reviewer, and article-provider.56
Weinberg’s rhetoric provoked and yet attracted audiences, who appear
to have found the notion of technological fixes variously compelling, naïvely
confident, or threatening. The earliest disciplinary criticism came from
scholars who disparaged Weinberg’s phrase “social engineering”—a term he
had employed in correspondence from at least early 1966. Among the first
was a representative of the American Geophysical Union, who identified it
as an aspersion on engineers. Weinberg replied to suggest a different target:
“[T]he whole burden of my article was to point out that the technologist—
i.e. the real engineer—has much to offer in the solution of social problems
that are usually considered to be the province of those who try to manipu-
late social behavior; it is the latter whom I call ‘social engineers.’”57
This reduction of the social sciences and traditional humanistic ap-
proaches for problem-solving, including education, religion, and politics,
to mere “engineering” and “manipulation” challenged his counterparts in
those fields. Even worse, Weinberg had repeatedly dismissed such tech-
niques as inferior to technological innovation. Sociologist of science Ber-
nard Barber dubbed Weinberg (and his ally Brooks) a “gifted amateur” and
“scientist-sage,” but argued that “science policy studies need to keep close
contact with the fundamental social science disciplines, with their best the-
ories and their best research methods and findings.”58
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60. Eugene M. Burns and Kenneth E. Studer, “Reflections on Alvin M. Weinberg,”
34–35 (emphasis in original).
61. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Response to Burns and Studer’s ‘Reflections on Alvin M.
Weinberg,’” 197, 199; Eugene M. Burns and Kenneth E. Studer, “Reply to Alvin M.
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Meier criticized Weinberg’s proposal to scale up technological fixes in
agro-nuclear complexes. Such “nuplexes,” Meier argued, were a variant of
earlier optimistic sociotechnical systems; the history of creating such large
conglomerations of interdependent ancillary industries had shown them,
he argued, to be “dismal failures,” because they had not addressed “people
problems” relating to “settlement procedures, laws, customs, education,
marketing, management, and so on.” Meier stated that technological fixes
required carefully planned social interventions to be successful.59
The most direct appraisal appeared nearly a decade after Weinberg’s
first speeches on the subject. Sociologists Eugene Burns and Kenneth Stu-
der characterized his notions as simplistic: 
It is not difficult to see the immediate sanity of such technological
fixes as safer automobiles and polio vaccine, for these fixes comple-
ment many traditional social values. It is quite another thing, how-
ever, to believe that poverty is anywhere near as tractable as
Weinberg suggests. His insensitivity to the social structure of social
problems (e.g. with regard to poverty, relative deprivation, rising
expectations, etc.) only too readily reveals the technico-scientific 
bias of his solutions. . . . Weinberg is thereby constrained to focus 
primarily on second-order social problems, namely problems that 
are precipitated by prior technological fixes.60
In a subsequent exchange, the authors summarized Weinberg as propos-
ing “scientistic, reductionistic, solutions”—an unsupportable faith in the
methods of physical science and a myopic approach to problem-solving.
Weinberg disingenuously denied “any grand social philosophy” or “mu-
tual consistency” in his writings. “The authors read too much into my
views when they claim to see this as evidence of my naïve belief in the pos-
sible redemption of society by science,” he observed, but reiterated that
“social fixes, no less than technological fixes, have deleterious and unfore-
seen side effects; and social fixes, precisely because they get to the heart of
the matter rather than remedying effects, have a history of going more
awry than do technological fixes.”61
For wider audiences, critiques of technology, like expressions of tech-
nological faith, grew within a particular historical context. As Weinberg
promoted his views during the late 1960s and early ’70s, critical assessments
from distinct sources identified reliance upon technological solutions as
evidence for inadequate engineering practice, failures of government policy,
or expressions of corporate self-interest. Health technologies raised few
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concerns during this period, which showed remarkable successes in devel-
oping treatments for illnesses and improving the quality of individual lives.
Weinberg himself had cited cigarette filters as a technological fix that was
self-evidently easier than persuading users to give up smoking.62 There
were, however, specific topics that raised growing disquiet among con-
sumers, notably concerns about the effects of food additives and dietary
supplements and the depersonalization of scientific medicine.
Moreover, the growing counterculture of the 1960s portrayed the Viet-
nam War as a conflict in which the high technology developed by the U.S.
military-industrial complex was proving impotent against a resourceful
enemy employing more appropriate technologies.63 For a wider cross-sec-
tion of society alienated by a seemingly shrouded industry, nuclear energy
raised growing concerns as inherently dangerous and potentially injurious
to health.64 And media accounts of the pollution of air and water increas-
ingly pinned responsibility on short-sighted industries or more generically
identified them as a widespread byproduct of industrial society.65
As early as 1970, Weinberg attacked technological pessimism by ap-
pealing in his commencement addresses to college engineering graduates.
For these audiences, Weinberg’s defense was nuanced. He acknowledged
that “technological fixes are viewed with great suspicion . . . by many social
activists” and that “we technologists are aware of the shortcomings”; he
noted that the green revolution in India had “created unemployment among
agricultural workers as well as undermined the social structure of the vil-
lage.” But addressing politics more directly, he observed that social fixes had
a history of errors at least as great: “our U.S. Constitution, with its intricate
and almost mechanical checks and balances, represents a social fix on a
grand scale. Or Karl Marx, with his curious mixture of Hegel and science
created an all-encompassing system which was supposed to lead to Utopia
on Earth.” And, hinting at the ongoing impeachment proceedings against
Nixon, Weinberg underlined that “our U.S. Constitution is imperfect; the
incredible stresses it is now undergoing are evidence enough of this.” In its
place, he argued that technology could serve as a calming counter-force to
62. Alvin Weinberg to W. Hines, letter, 27 July 1967, “Chron 1967-2” file, cabinet
5, drawer 4, in CMOR.
63. Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; Peter Galison and Bar-
ton J. Bernstein, “Physics between War and Peace”; Paul Boyer, “From Activism to
Apathy.”
64. Fred H. Knelman, Nuclear Energy; Brian Balogh, Chain Reaction; Howard Hu,
Katherine Yih, and Arjun Makhijani, Nuclear Wastelands.
65. For example, Love Canal, near Niagara Falls, New York, became infamous during
the late 1970s as a human environment ruined by leakage from a toxic waste dump. From
the late 1960s, technological opposition in the United States was directed successively
toward the use of Agent Orange defoliant in Vietnam, the Supersonic Transport initiative,
the Alaska Oil Pipeline, and, particularly after the Three Mile Island incident in 1977,
nuclear power plants. See, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial; Mel Hor-
witch, Clipped Wings; and Peter A. Coates, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy.
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unstable politics: “Our political system is geared to a four-year cycle. This
our founding fathers recognized as necessary to prevent against tyranny. But
in guarding against tyranny we have created a mismatch: the time scale of
politics is far shorter than the time span of technology.”
The “new style of social thinking,” he suggested, “forces us to look at our
sociotechnological dilemmas from a longer perspective of time than is our
custom.” Sound technological optimism, Weinberg concluded, tipped the
balance from social to technological fixes: doomsayers quoting Limits to
Growth would be countered by young technologists “who foresee solutions
to all its problems.” This placed a unique responsibility on the technologi-
cal elite to “use this sophistication to break prevailing chains of short-sight-
edness—even though at times it may place you in temporary disfavor. Your
technological fixes will thereby become more humane; and, more impor-
tantly, each of your lives will thereby be made more richly human.”66
But ethicists also weighed in. Max Oelschlaeger argued that the notion
of the technological fix had become a popular myth accepted as much by
large companies as the general population.67 The ethical ramifications of
technological reliance were more centrally addressed by philosopher Arne
Naess from the early 1970s on. He argued that the seeming “reasonable-
ness” of these solutions was largely determined by the narrow framing of
the problem and failed to explore the cultural presuppositions about the
nature and potency of technologies. Naess suggested a new framing in
which technologically oriented, short-term “shallow” environmental solu-
tions were replaced by “deep ecology,” seeking to address systemic faults
holistically via a combination of social, cultural, and technical solutions.68
The political dimensions of technological fixes, however, elicited per-
haps the most enduring interest and illustrate the evolution of Weinberg’s
views concerning technological power and expertise. As early as 1966, a
reviewer for the Socialist Labor Party described Weinberg’s thesis as “spe-
ciously attractive” and agreed that the “social engineers [are] woefully in-
effective,” but identified Marxism as the only genuine social science.
Identifying technological change as “the force to which society’s institu-
tions must ultimately conform,” it castigated Weinberg for having given up
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69. “The Social Scientists.”
70. Paul A. Baran, “Review of Meier, Richard L, Science and Economic Develop-
ment,” esp. 1021; William E. Akin, Technocracy and the American Dream; Beverley H.
Burris, Technocracy at Work.
71. Weinberg, “Social Problems and National Socio-Technical Institutes,” 433.
72. Alvin M. Weinberg, “How Appropriate Is Appropriate Technology?” and “A
Wake-Up Call for Technological Somnambulists”; Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts
Have Politics?”
his conviction that society’s agenda should focus on the major task of
social reorganization.69
Others argued that the technocratic faith implicit in Weinberg’s work
required an unlikely and worrying transfer of power to technologists—a
criticism leveled at Meier’s writings a decade earlier and indeed at the tech-
nocrats of the early 1930s.70 In his lobbying for socially oriented big sci-
ence, Weinberg had recognized that think tanks of experts were potentially
dangerous, because technical complexities of the issues prevented public
debate. “Many of our strategic doctrines . . . can be traced to RAND [and]
it is somewhat disconcerting that they are formulated by experts who, at
least from the outside, appear to sit apart and to operate on their own.” His
proposed solution was to establish two competing institutes, in the way
that the Oak Ridge and Argonne and Los Alamos and Livermore national
laboratories “keep each other honest.” In this respect, Weinberg’s views
deviated from the earlier technocrats: where they had proposed replacing
political leaders with governance by technologists, Weinberg envisaged
engineers and scientists in government-funded national labs to devise
solutions to problems identified by others. Both views, however, bypassed
direct democratic involvement in favor of rational elites.71
During the 1980s and particularly via Shils and Minerva, Weinberg
continued to contribute to developments in science and technology stud-
ies and reflected more explicitly on their political dimensions. He pro-
nounced Langdon Winner’s piece, “Building the Better Mousetrap,” as
“the most readable and cleverest of essays,” and admitted learning more
about the political ramifications of technology from Winner’s “graceful es-
says” in The Whale and the Reactor (1986), while seemingly missing the
most striking technological fix described in the book: his description of
New York City parkway overpasses built low so that buses carrying urban
poor were unable to reach prime suburban recreation areas. Equally sur-
prisingly, there are no extant documents revealing his views about Win-
ner’s best-known essay, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?,” which explores the
link between technological innovation and political effects—a connection
sought by Weinberg for two decades. Instead, he proffered that Winner
was too pessimistic, underlining that “as a technologist unversed in poli-
tics, I would claim that technological fixes are easier than social fixes.”
Indeed, in his 1994 autobiography he asserted that his career was that of a
“technological optimist” and “technological fixer.”72
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Dioxide and Water (Manuscript, 24 Mar 1994)” Box 114, folder 24, in MPA.0332; Pat-
rick Moriarty and Damon Honnery, “Nuclear Energy.”
74. Emanuel Epstein to Alvin Weinberg, letter, 5 May 1971, unmarked file, cabinet
12, drawer 1, in CMOR.
75. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy,” “Salvaging the
Nuclear Age,” and “Inherently Safe Technologies.”
76. Alvin M. Weinberg, “The Sanctification of Hiroshima” and “The Limits of Sci-
ence and Trans-Science.”
Conclusion: Trajectory of a Concept and a Career
There are ironies in Weinberg’s promotion of the technological fix.
Career experiences repeatedly challenged his lifelong faith in technological
innovation as a societal resource. He was an early admirer of Rachel Car-
son and had actively promoted attention to the environmental side-effects
of technologies. Weinberg was an early advocate of nuclear power as a low-
carbon fix to avoid climate change, and regretted having done little at
ORNL to focus attention on the persistent problem of nuclear waste dis-
posal.73 By the end of the 1960s, however, this progressive stance—dis-
tinctly out of step with many of his establishment peers—became blurred.
His public addresses increasingly were targeted at “primarily the young,
anti-technology revolutionaries and their more passive, but worried fol-
lowers.”74 And yet, his outspokenness was not on-message within the
nuclear industry either. He was dismissed as the director of ORNL in 1973
during the first Nixon administration because of his publicly expressed
criticisms of reactor safety.
Fashioning a role as director of the new Institute of Energy Analysis,
Weinberg’s proposed alternatives eroded his confident championing of
technological fixes (fig. 4). He envisaged a combination of technical and
social components to the solution: a new generation of “inherently safe”
reactor designs, but strategically sited in large clusters far from popula-
tions, in high-security “nuclear parks” tended by a “nuclear priesthood” of
specialists. Technological improvisation thus ceded place to ponderous
societal rearrangements.75 In a similar vein, he later suggested that the
Hiroshima atomic bomb had been necessary and effective in the short
term, but that only its public “elevation . . . to the status of a profoundly
mystical event” could avoid future nuclear wars. Weinberg’s neologism
“trans-scientific” labeled such problems that transcended scientific analy-
sis and required corollary social and moral considerations.76
Over the same period, he reluctantly came to recognize that his lifelong
optimism for nuclear power was unshared by the American public. In a let-
ter to Shils, he concluded “the sorry history of nuclear power seems to sup-
port a growing view that risky technology is incompatible with liberal
democracy,” and, reflecting on the relative success of nuclear programs in
other countries, observed that “nuclear energy seems to do best where the
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77. Alvin Weinberg to Edward Shils, letter, 30 August 1988, box 78, folder 9, in
MPA; Alvin M. Weinberg, “Nuclear Power and Public Perception,” 279. 
78. Anthologies include Mesthene, ed., Technology and Social Change; Noel de Nev-
ers, ed., Technology and Society; Albert H. Teich, ed., Technology and Man’s Future;
Nigel Cross, David Elliott, and Robin Roy, eds., Man-Made Futures; Albert Teich, ed.,
Technology and the Future; W. B. Thompson, ed., Controlling Technology; Alvin M.
Weinberg, ed., Nuclear Reactions; M. Anne Howard, ed., An Environmental Policy
Reader; Nancy R. MacKenzie, ed., Science and Technology Today; and Gail E. Hawisher
and Cynthia L. Selfe, eds., Literacy, Technology, and Society.
underlying political structure is elitist.” Alongside Winner, he acknowledged
that certain technological solutions could not only produce powerful politi-
cal consequences, but might also require particular political environments.77
And yet, Weinberg’s curiously imprecise conception of technological
fixes was remarkably successful, remaining in the public discourse from its
origin in the mid-1960s over the following four decades of his life.78 The
present narrative has illustrated how his notion of the technological fix
reflected the views of his peers and career context, and it can be traced to
experiences shared by many U.S. technologists and analysts of his times.
Why then did his particular ideas create such enduring impact?
First, Weinberg’s voice was favored as a national laboratory director
with privileged access to policy-makers and industrialists. His active net-
working engaged peers from a broad range of disciplines as critical friends;
his career translated him from an interwar progressive to an apolitical
champion of progressive technologies. Instead of opposing politicians as
the technocrats had, he conceived nationally funded technologists, and
their technological fixes, as the tools of good government. 
FIG. 4 Weinberg as first Director of the Institute of Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge
Associated Universities, circa 1982. (Source: MPA.0332 Box 56, folder 16. Uni-
versity of Tennessee, Knoxville—Libraries.)
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Second, Weinberg was a skilled and tireless communicator. He crafted
his writings to be readily absorbed and was unusually active in promoting
the republication of his essays for varied audiences. Meier suggested that
his coinage itself was seductive: the word fix connoted “a dramatic im-
provement, and therefore, it was widely discussed.” Other scholars, while
critical of Weinberg’s views, praised his role as “one of the more outstand-
ing and articulate of the science policy thinkers,” whose clearly formulated
views allowed “a more incisive criticism.”79 On the other hand, his shifting
public stances effectively reflected his evolving confidences and varied
audiences. Weinberg was at his most bullish and optimistic in commence-
ment addresses to college engineering graduates, but tentative and concil-
iatory in communications directed at scholars of social sciences and hu-
manities. His musings framed questions to encourage discussion.
Third, and most importantly for his long-lived influence, Weinberg’s
rhetorical style eluded detailed unpacking. A “Teflon man” before the term
was coined for Ronald Reagan, he achieved fame with little notoriety by
deftly shedding criticism; his examples were brief and appealed to common
sense rather than thorough analysis. Definitions of technological fixes were
mutable, alternately conceived as temporary solutions that bought time for
social methods or as large-scale systems that shaped citizen options and
replaced social science altogether. He also skillfully preempted criticism by
raising some of his critics’ objections himself. Playing devil’s advocate and
portraying himself as neutral and diffident rather than polemical, his
ambivalence preserved his critical stance.80
In later years, Weinberg identified himself more overtly and confi-
dently with technological fixes. What he had painted as disingenuous
“what-if” scenarios in the late 1960s were openly represented as matters of
personal conviction and even defiance a quarter-century later. In his final
decade, Weinberg reflected that “Paul Ehrlich’s derisive description” of
him as “king of the technological optimists” was justified, but that he 
nevertheless felt vindicated: “I write as the Cold War has ended. Deep in
our hearts we realize that all this was made possible by a technological fix—
the hydrogen bomb.”81
While critiqued by particular audiences, Weinberg’s seductive notions
were mainstreamed to shape the confidences of those seeking solutions to
novel and enduring societal problems. Notions that had at mid-century been
the province of a technological elite became a widely shared belief of broader
publics. As an articulate voice for technological solutions to wider societal
issues, he consolidated and lucidly framed ideas circulating among his peers.
By offering examples and discussing their wider implications—and just as
79. Meier, “The Social Impact of a Nuplex,” 16; Burns and Studer, “Reflections on
Alvin M. Weinberg.”
80. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Beyond the Technological Fix,” 3.
81. Alvin M. Weinberg, “Chapters from the Life of a Technological Fixer.”
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importantly, by labeling the concept concisely—Weinberg’s rhetoric shaped
and continues to influence discourses about technological solutions to soci-
etal problems, and about the wider roles of technology in society.
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